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United States Corporations Operating in
Saudi Arabia and Laws Affecting
Discrimination in Employment:
Which Law Shall Prevail?
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the major forces which have come into prominence in
the American business world in recent years, two are of interest here:
the continuing trend to multi-national corporate operations' and the
passage of numerous laws and regulations affecting discrimination in
employment. 2 Inevitably, conflicts have arisen between American
and foreign cultures concerning the effect of United States employ-
ment discrimination laws on hiring practices for posts in foreign
countries. In order to clearly show some of these cultural conflicts,
this comment will focus on the hiring practices of United States cor-
porations operating in Saudi Arabia. The acute difference in cultural
values between Saudi Arabia and the United States, including atti-
tudes towards employment rights, highlights problems which arise in
international employment.
Specific attention will be given to Kern v. Dynalectron Corpora-
tion3 and Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine,4 two recent cases con-
cerning religious discrimination in hiring for posts in Saudi Arabia;
and to Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.', an analogous case concerning al-
leged discrimination against women applying for work with a United
States corporation operating in South America. The Fernandez case
was chosen because there are no specific cases on gender discrimina-
tion involving Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Fernandez serves to differen-
tiate between discrimination based on sexual stereotyping and
I. United States direct investment abroad increased from $11,788,000 in 1950 to
$78,090,000 in 1970. INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIAL POLICY 6 (1973). By 1975, 4,060,645 people were employed by United States corpora-
tions operating abroad. J. CURHAN, W. DAVIDSON, & R. SURI, TRACING THE MULTINA-
TIONALS 258 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, infra note 14; Exec. Order 11,246,
infra note 17.
3. 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), a.fd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
4. 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
5. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
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customer preference, which is prohibited under Fernandez,6 and dis-
crimination based upon actual foreign laws which must be followed
by a corporation operating within a host country.7
As an example, as early as 1959 United States courts confronted
the problem of United States corporations attempting to comply with
Saudi regulations against the hiring of Jews. In American Jewish Con-
gress v. Carter,' Justice Epstein made it clear that United States cor-
porations could not violate United States law-in that case, a New
York state anti-discrimination statute9 -while recruiting workers
within the United States for placement overseas.
The question of discrimination on the basis of sex has not been
directly addressed by the courts, at least partly due to the severe re-
strictions placed on the behavior of women in Saudi Arabia.10 It is
difficult to prove affimative discrimination where few, if any, women
have applied for jobs. Sex discrimination in employment is one of the
most pervasive forms of discrimination practiced world-wide, and
serves as an interesting vehicle for examining cultural differences.
It is perhaps in attitudes towards religion and the place of wo-
men in society that Saudi Arabia and the United States are most at
variance; therefore, these two areas are focused on, leaving aside ques-
tions of race, age, and national origin. By exploring the ramifications
of allowing or disallowing sex or religion to be used as hiring criteria
for United States corporations with operations in Saudi Arabia, possi-
ble procedures for dealing with the cultural clash involved in overseas
employment can be formulated. This comment will advocate contin-
ued strict application of employment discrimination laws in all con-
texts, and will show how this can be done even in recruiting for
positions in a country where discriminatory cultural values exist.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. American Law
Multinational corporations-including foreign corporations op-
erating in the United States11 and United States corporations operat-
6. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
8. Am. Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 19 Misc. 2d 5, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. 1959), affid., 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
9. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1)(a), (c) (McKinney 1982).
10. See infra notes 61-70, 122-23, and accompanying text.
11. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avigliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), where the Supreme
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ing abroad 2 -are regulated by many different federal and state laws
which generally forbid discrimination in employment. 3 Those most
important here include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1 4 especially
that section known as the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception; 15 provisions of the U.S.C. which prohibit joining
foreign boycotts; 6 and Executive Order No. 11,246, forbidding com-
panies with U.S. government contracts to discriminate in employment
decisions, 7 which has been implemented in the Code of Federal
Regulations. 18
1. Title VII
Title VII generally provides that no employer, employment
agency, or labor organization may discriminate "because of [an] indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or'national origin."1 9 The primary
thrust, therefore, is to prohibit discrimination; any deviation from this
standard is an exception. This provision has been interpreted by
courts to cover United States corporations operating abroad, as long
as the company is one involved in international commerce 20 and the
prospective employees are United States citizens. 2' By express lan-
Court ruled that wholly owned subsidiaries of a Japanese corporation operating in the United
States are covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
12. See, e.g., Am. Jewish Congress v. Carter, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1959); Fernandez v.
Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
13. Most employers of more than moderate size are covered by federal Title VII; all but
six states have comparable laws. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES
AND MATERLkdS 24 (1984).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (19,82) [hereinafter cited as BFOQ exception].
16. 50 App. U.S.C. § 2407 (1976 and Supp. 11 1979).
17. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965) and amendments, reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000-e (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Executive Order]. In addition, companies may be
affected by state laws forbidding discrimination in employment. Se e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§§ 296-99 (McKinney 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12920-21 (West 1980).
18. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1 et seq. (1982).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(b)(c) (1982).
20. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, as noted in 110 CONG. REc. S7210 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964) (memo-
randum by Sec'y of Labor Wirtz). Therefore any United States corporation involved in "com-
merce with foreign nations [or] among the several states" would be covered by Title VII
legislation.
21. See, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 423 (D. Colo. 1976),
in which American porters who worked on trains passing through Canada were deemed enti-
tled to Title VII protection. The court specifically relied on the extra.territorial reach of anti-
trust laws, but also noted the inferences raised by specific language in Title VII. Id at 426,
n.4. Later cases specifically uphold extraterritorial application of Title VII. Kern v. Dynalec-
tron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), aff'd men., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984)
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guage Title VII itself specifically exempts coverage of aliens employed
outside the United States, and thus by implication includes citizens
employed outside the country.22 Although not yet explicitly ruled on
by the United States Supreme Court, this conclusion, that United
States ctizens working abroad for United States companies are cov-
ered by United States anti-discrimination laws, has been implicitly
reached by several federal courts and no longer seems to be an issue in
current cases.23 This conclusion makes it much easier for United
States citizens denied employment by United States corporations op-
erating abroad to enforce their rights under Title VII, as it enables
them to sue in United States courts under American laws. If it were
otherwise, United States corporations might claim to be subject only
to the laws of the host country, thus avoiding compliance with the
(often more stringent) non-discrimination protections in United States
law.
2. Title VII: the BFOQ exception
Certain corporations have attempted to utilize the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (BFOQ) exception in Title VII to avoid the
application of the main body of Title VII in their overseas operations.
The BFOQ exception provides that it will not be illegal to discrimi-
nate "on the basis of. . . religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of that particular business or enterprise. ' ' 24 The BFOQ exception
has been narrowly construed by both the Equal Employment Oppor-
(district court accepts jurisdiction over case, including subject matter, person, and stipulation
that defendant was an employer covered by Title VII); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981) ("No foreign nation can compel the non-enforcement of Title VII
here."). But see Bryant v. Int'l Schools, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980) (sustained extra-
territorial application of Title VII), rev'd, 675 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir. 1982). The circuit court
noted that "[t]his case raises significant questions regarding the applicability of Title VII to the
overseas employment practices of a private American employer and the scope and meaning of
that statute's proscription against sex-based discrimination in employment," but primarily dis-
cussed the latter concerns. Id. at 565. The court noted that "no court has decided the extra-
territorial applicability of Title VII and we find it unnecessary to do so to decide this case." Id.
at 577, n.23.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1982) provides "this title shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, . . . ." See also Comment, The Mul.
tinational Corporation and Employment Discrimination: A Strategy for Litigation, 16 U.S.F.L.
REV. 491, 503 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Strategy for Litigation].
23. See supra note 21.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
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tunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with enforce-
ment of Title VII,2" and by the federal courts.
The EEOC regulations state that sex is to be allowed as a BFOQ
only if authenticity or genuineness is required, such as in hiring an
actor or actress.26 The federal courts have generally supported this
interpretation, ruling that stereotypical assumptions do not qualify as
a BFOQ exception in cases concerning flight attendants,2' telegraph
agents, 28 telephone installers,29 and caretakers in a home for juvenile
males.30 These cases, and others, have established a three-part test for
the BFOQ exception: (1) all or substantially all members of a group
must lack a desired characteristic;3  (2) the link between the desired
characteristic and the included group must not be based on stere-
otypical assumptions; 32 and (3) the desired characteristic must pertain
to some action which is essential to the given business.33
Courts have slightly expanded on this definition, allowing a
BFOQ exception in Dothard v. Rawlinson for all-male guards in a
prison characterized as violent, understaffed, poorly designed for sep-
aration of guards and prisoners, and "composed of sex offenders
mixed randomly with other prisoners, ' 34 but not in a minimum secur-
ity prison with non-violent prisoners, with many non-contact jobs.3
Later commentators have noted that Dothard is to be interpreted nar-
rowly and limited to its own facts: an environment where the very
presence of women would add to an already tense situation, therefore
increasing the risk to all workers, regardless of the willingness of wo-
men to accept individual risk and their ability to defend themselves
individually.36
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1982).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1982).
27. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (preference of male
customers for unmarried female flight attendants not a BFOQ).
28. Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (stereotypical assumptions
about women do not rise to level of BFOQ).
29. Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant must show
that "all or substantially all" women cannot perform, or there is no BFOQ defense).
30. Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1982) (BFOQ is an ex-
tremely narrow exception to Title VII).
31. Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
32. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224-25.
33. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
34. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977).
35. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
36. See Note, Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification: Defining Title Virs Evolv-
ing Enigma, Related Litigation Problems and the Judicial Vision of Womanhood after Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 5 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 107, 161 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sex as a BFOQ ].
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The BFOQ for religious employment has been similarly narrowly
construed. Generally, religious institutions themselves have been al-
lowed to require that employees be members of that religion.3" Re-
cently, a Catholic university was allowed to exclude non-Catholics
from professorships on the basis of the BFOQ exception. 38  In con-
trast, churches have not been allowed to require church membership
for employment in a church-owned, secular, non-educational institu-
tion. In a recent case, a circuit court held that the Mormon Church
could not require church membership for employees of a church-
owned gymnasium, as the gymnasium activities were not closely re-
lated to the beliefs of the Mormon Church. 9
3. Foreign boycott provisions of the
Export Administration Act of 1979
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) provides that
United States companies cannot "refuse to do business" due to boy-
cotts imposed by foreign governments.' ° The Act thereby closed a
potential loophole created by the BFOQ exception. Prior to passage
37. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1982).
38. Pime v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 505 F. Supp. 435, 442 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1984) (reli-
gion is a BFOQ defense in preference for hiring Catholics at a Jesuit-run university).
39. Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah, C.D. 1984). The case was decided under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
1, infra text accompanying note 98, and not the BFOQ exception, but the analysis used in
delineating when it is legal to require employees to be of a certain religion is similar. The Amos
case thoroughly covers the history of the religious exemption to Title VII in the courts.
40. 50 App. § 2409.7 (Supp. III, 1979), 15 C.F.R. 369.1 et seq. (1982). A table from 15
C.F.R. § 369.2 best illustrates this prohibition:
PROHIBITION AGAINST REFUSALS TO DO BUSINESS
No United States person to do business when such a refusal is pur-
may: suant to:
refuse, with or in a boycotted coun- an agreement with the boy-
knowingly agree to refuse, try, cotting country,
require any other person to with any business concern a requirement of the boy-
refuse organized under the laws of cotting country
OR a boycotted country, OR
knowingly agree to require with any national or resident a request from or on behalf
any other person to refuse. of the boycotted country, of the boycotting country
OR
with any other person.
The Abrams case interpreted this to include American Jews under the wording "or any other
person." Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
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of the EAA, it was theoretically possible for a corporation to claim
that it could legally discriminate against Jews in hiring-for Near East-
ern positions because the Arab boycott of Israel made this "reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the business." As noted in
Abrams v. Baylor, 41 the anti-boycott regulations were passed by Con-
gress in response to Arab boycotts of Israeli interests.42 Since the reg-
ulation itself does not specify which boycotts are excluded, however,
there is a possibility for future extension in cases which Congress did
not foresee. For example, the boycott against South Africa was theo-
retically not legal until sanctioned by the President this year, since
United States citizens may only participate in boycotts which are
sanctioned by the United States government. 3 As of this date the
EAA has been used only as originally intended by Congress"--to
prevent United States companies from adhering to a boycott of Jew-
ish/Israeli interests.
In at least one case involving discrimination against Jews by
United States corporations hiring for positions in Saudi Arabia, a
United States court has allowed an individual plaintiff to sue under
the EAA as well as under Title VII, ruling that there is a private right
of action under the EAA.45 The constitutionality of the EAA as a
whole was effectively upheld in Briggs and Stratton v. Baldrige, a Sev-
enth Circuit case.' Briggs was concerned primarily with answering a
questionnaire from Arab League countries concerning business deal-
41. Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
42. This occurred early in the 1970's, leading to passage of the EAA in 1979. Id.
43. It might be possible for United States companies operating in South Africa to claim
that they must continue operating there because to do otherwise would be acceeding to the
boycott of South Africa by black African nations. It is also theoretically possible that a boy-
cott of Arabian countries which do not allow women to work on an equal level with men could
not be honored by United States companies. There is a possibility here of direct conflict be-
tween the EAA and provisions of Title VII. However, the EAA allows boycotts approved by
the United States government, and it is arguable that the boycott of South Africa is supported
by the Reagan administration, since Reagan has imposed certain restrictions on trade with
South Africa. Sandier, Reagan Imposes Limited Sanctions Against South Africa, L.A. Daily J.,
Sept. 10, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
44. S. Rep. No. 95-104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19 (1978) and H.R. Rep. No. 95-3590,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-58 (1978), both emphasizing the effect of the boycott on American
business and the necessity for the United States to lead resistance against the Arab boycott.
45. See Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581-82.
46. Briggs & Stratton Co. v. Baldrige, 539 F. Supp. 1307, (E.D. Wis. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Briggs I] and Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983) were re-
viewed by the 7th Circuit in Briggs & Stratton Co. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Briggs II], cern denied sub nom. Trane Co. v. Baldrige, 105 S. Ct. 105
(1984).
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ings with Israel,47 and was decided primarily on a First Amendment,
commercial speech analysis.4 8 Briggs is also certainly applicable to
other aspects of the EAA, including those under which discrimination
in employment to satisfy a foreign boycott is forbidden. 9 The Briggs
court specifically noted that the EAA supported substantial govern-
mental interests, such as foreign policy matters and American values,
since it was designed to forestall "attempts by foreign governments to
'embroil American citizens in their battles against others by forcing
them to participate in actions which are repugnant to American val-
ues and traditions.' "50 It is certainly arguable that equality of oppor-
tunity in employment is one of the "American values" which the
Briggs court held to be of substantial governmental interest.
4. Executive Order No. 11,246
Executive Order No. 11,246, as amended, 51 requires that federal
government contractors and subcontractors take "affirmative action"
to prevent discrimination in hiring, promoting, or transferring em-
ployees. 2 Unlike Title VII, the Executive Order mandates action to
prevent discrimination and to promote hiring of groups (not individu-
als) with a past history as victims of discrimination. 53 Thus, the Exec-
utive Order can have far-reaching effects on the day-to-day operations
of many United States corporations, including those operating over-
seas, since it mandates that all government contractors hire and pro-
mote without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
5 4
Moreover, the Executive Order requires that these same contractors
implement a written affirmative action program to lead to a "prompt
47. Briggs I at 1310-11.
48. Id.
49. Briggs II, passim. Briggs II adopted the lower court opinion of Briggs I and decided
the First Amendment contentions of the appellants.
50. Briggs I at 1319.
51. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1965); amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,
3 C.F.R. § 684 (1967); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. § 803 (1969), and Exec. Order No.
12,086, 3 C.F.R. § 230 (1978). The Executive Order was codified in various sections of the
Code of Federal Regulations; those provisions of interest here are codified in Title 41.
52. Various provisions of the Executive Order mandate that a government contractor
pledge in its contract not to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; post notices to this effect where employees and applicants can see them; and agree to
abide by all provisions of the Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. § 339.1
(1965).
53. Id. Groups covered include women, racial minorities, and ethnic minorities. 41
C.F.R. § 60-1.1 (1984).
54. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.1 (1984).
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achievement of full and equal employment opportunity. 5 Almost all
multinational corporations have either direct or indirect contracts
with the federal government, thus subjecting them to the require-
ments of the Executive Order.56 Although a limited exemption is pro-
vided in the Executive Order for overseas operations," it grants little
relief to multinational corporations, as it only applies "with regard to
work performed outside the United States by employees who were not
recruited within the United States."58
B. Saudi Arabian Law
1. Introduction
In moving from a discussion of United States law to Saudi Ara-
bian law, an almost complete change in focus is necessary. United
States law is a mutable, statutorily based, government based entity,
crafted by people.59 In contrast, Saudi Arabian law is based on the
word of God as given in the Qur'an, promulgated by the prophets,
and enforced (generally) by custom as much as by government. 60
Therefore, it is often impossible to state specifically what is "the law"
in Saudi Arabia, since much law is unwritten, few if any court cases
are recorded, and most statutory law is in the form of proclamations
issued by the King of Saudi Arabia and his ministers.61
2. Islamic law in general
Islamic law is based upon the concept of the Shari'a, or totality
of God's commandments. The Qur'an as the word of God is the pri-
mary source of all law,62 supplemented by the traditions of the
prophet Mohammed, or sunnah.63 It must be understood that the
Shari'a is not canon law as that term is understood today. In western
culture, canon law is seen as a separate entity apart from people's
everyday life applying solely to religious matters. Instead, the Shari'a
governs all aspects of everyday life, and forms the foundation of Mus-
55. Id. at § 60-1.40.
56. Strategy for Litigation, supra note 22, at 496-97.
57. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.10 (1984).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 5 (1930).
60. M. RODINSON, IsLAM AND CAPITAISM passim (trans. B. Pierce 1978).
61. Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic
Law, 12 INT'L LAW. 321, 322-25 (1978).
62. Id. at 323.
63. Id. at 323-26.
1985]
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lim experience."
Saudi Arabia is governed by the most conservative of the four
Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanbali school,6" with
supplemental regulations supplied by promulgations of the King and
his ministers.66 The decrees of the Hanbali scholars are enforced by
the Shari'a courts, which comprise two lower courts and two Courts
of Appeal.67 In 1970, a Ministry of Justice was formed, added to in
1975 by a Supreme Judicial Council designed to oversee the Shari'a
courts. 68 In addition, there are semi-judicial courts set up to enforce
the regulations of ministers and the King,69 which are not considered
law, but lesser promulgations, since given by man, not God.70 Some
enforcement is also carried out by the morals or religious police, who
concentrate on such items as modesty in dress for women, separation
of the sexes outside of the home, enforcement of the daily prayer
hours, and similar concerns.7"
4. Saudi Arabian law and foreign businesses
Under Saudi regulations, all foreign companies operating in
Saudi Arabia are subject to Saudi law.72 Contract provisions requir-
ing that all disputes be tried under Saudi law have been at least par-
tially upheld by United States courts.73 It is in enforcement of such
contract provisions that the most egregious problems concerning em-
ployment discrimination are bound to occur. Saudi Arabia has
promulgated regulations concerning companies doing business with
Israel7 4 and the employment and segregation of women75 which ap-
64. Id.
65. Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government Saudi Arabia Supplements the
Shari'a to Regulate Development, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 421-22 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Islamic Law]. In the Hanbali school, the only sources of law are the Qur'an, the
sayings of Mohammed, the legal opinions of Mohammed's companions, the sayings of certain
of these companions, and reasoning by analogy when no other way is available. Id. at 422.
66. T. PEASLEE, 2 CONSTrTUTIONS OF NATIONS 1090 (rev. 3d ed. 1966).
67. Islamic Law, supra note 65, at 440.
68. Id. at 441.
69. Asherman, supra note 61, at 328.
70. Islamic Law, supra note 65, at 439.
71. R. NYioP, AREA HANDBOOK FOR SAUDI ARABIA 125 (1977).
72. Royal Decree No. 35 (1964), quoted in Mustafa, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in
Saudi Arabia, in THE MIDDLE EAST-A LEGAL UPDATE 13, 42 (1978).
73. Pirkey v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 483 F. Supp. 770 (D. Colo. 1980).
74. Saudi Arabia has never recognized Israel as an independent state and thus ignores all
ties to that state. R. NYROP, supra note 71, at 214.
75. A decree of 1979 established that women may not work with men or foreigners. D.
PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD: ISLAM AND POLmCAL POWER 234 (1983).
144 [Vol. 8:135
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pear to be in direct conflict with United States mandates of equal
treatment for all.
76
Exceptions to-or clarification of-these Saudi regulations must
be made. Muslims have historically been tolerant of Jews, as fellow
"people of the book."' 17 It is Israel, a political state, for which they
have animosity, and which has led at times to the exclusion of Jews
from Saudi Arabia. 8 This restriction was relaxed in 1975 by a decree
that "any foreigner sent to Saudi Arabia in fulfillment of contractual
obligations will be welcome."'79 Unfortunately, this may not end all
discrimination, as Saudis may attempt to exclude Jews by contract
provisions requiring that United States companies adhere to the Ara-
bian boycott of Israel or by refusing visas to United States citizens
whose passports indicate that they have traveled to Israel.80
Regulations concerning women stem from a different set of cir-
cumstances. There are precepts in the Qur'an which prescribe a lesser
share to women in inheritance"1 and which equate the testimony of
two women with that of one man.8 2 Some commentators argue that
these precepts "guarantee rights to women where none had previously
existed."'83 Moreover, no specific prohibition of equality between the
sexes exists in the Qur'an.8' In addition, Saudi feminists state that
there is no absolute prohibition in the Qur'an against women working
side by side and on an equal basis with men. 5 However, these argu-
ments must be viewed in light of the specific precepts of the Shari'a
and the restrictions placed on women by the 1979 decrees re-enforc-
ing the Shari'a following the takeover of the mosque at Mecca and a
resurgence of religious fundamentalism.8 6 These new regulations
state that Saudi women cannot travel alone, work with men, work
with non-Muslim foreigners, dress immodestly, wear crosses openly,
76. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
77. R. NYROP, supra note 71, at 119.
78. Id. at 214. The reasoning of the Saudi government is: Israel has illegally taken part of
the Arab homeland; Saudi Arabia and Israel are therefore technically at war; the Israeli consti-
tution recognizes all Jews as Israeli citizens; therefore all Jews are enemy aliens.
79. Id.
80. Abrams v. Baylor Coil of Med., 581 F. Supp. 1570, 1574-75 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
81. QUR'AN, Sura [chapter] iv, verse 11 (A. Yusuf Ali trans. 1946) [hereinafter cited as
s.iv, v.11].
82. Id at s.ii, v.282.
83. A. SHAw AND D. LONG, SAUDI ARABIAN MODERNIZATION: THE IMPACT OF
CHANGE ON STABILITY 95 (1982).
84. Id See also QUR'AN, translator's note at p. 76.
85. See infra text accompanying note 150.
86. D. PIPES, supra note 75, at 234.
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or hold hands in public.87 These regulations also apply to United
States women in public, that is, when operating outside foreign resi-
dential compounds or foreign businesses.8 8
III. THE CLASH OF UNITED STATES AND SAUDI LAW
A. Religious and National Origin Discrimination
Two recent cases have specifically dealt with alleged religious
discrimination by United States corporations operating in Saudi Ara-
bia. Kern v. Dynalectron Corporation 81 concerned discrimination in
favor of Muslims for certain jobs, while Abrams v. Baylor Collge of
Medicine9° involved discrimination against Jews in hiring.
1. Kern v. Dynalectron Corporation
In Kern, the estate of a deceased Dynalectron employee sued the
company, alleging that a company requirement that all helicopter pi-
lots convert to Islam before being stationed in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
constituted religious discrimination under Title VII, by unlawfully de-
nying the applicant a job opportunity. 9 The court ruled that plaintiff
Kern had established a prima facie case of religious discrimination,
92
but that such discrimination was legally based upon a bona fide occu-
pational qualification exception, since being a Muslim was "of the es-
sence" for the job to be performed by Kern.93
The district court's reasoning focused on the specific relationship
between the corporation and the Islamic nation. Saudi Arabian law
requires that non-Muslims be excluded from Mecca on pain of
death.94 Dynalectron's contract with third party Kawasaki Corpora-
tion 95 provided that Dynalectron would supply helicopter pilots to
help in prevention and control of fires in the tents of pilgrims going to
Mecca.9 6 "Specifically, the subcontract dated August 28, 1977 re-
87. Id
88. N. ABRAHAM, DOING BuSINESS IN SAuDI ARABIA 275 (1980).
89. 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983), affid mere, 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984).
90. 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
91. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1198.
92. Id.
93. Id at 1203.
94. Id. at 1198. Apart from this case, it is difficult to substantitate that non-Muslims
found in Mecca are actually beheaded. Most books only state that no non-Muslims are al-
lowed in Mecca, and none have knowingly been admitted there since the 7th century. See, ag.,
R. NYRop, supra note 71, at 126.
95. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1197.
96. Id at 1197-98.
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quired that Moslem pilots and mechanics be provided as necessary for
operation in the holy area of Saudi Arabia. Thus the essence of
Dynalectron's business would be undermined by the beheading of all
the non-Moslem pilots based in Jeddah."97
It should be noted that the district court could have used a differ-
ent portion of Title VII in its analysis of Dynalectron's predicament.
Under Section 2000e-1 of Title VII, an exemption is available "to a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
to perform work connected with the carrying on .. .of its activi-
ties."9" Since Saudis consider the word of God to be the basis of law
in their country,9 9 and the ministers of Saudi Arabia swear loyalty to
God before swearing allegience to King and country,1 "o it could be
argued that Dynalectron was effectively acting as an agent for a reli-
gious society. This would apply only in situations such as those
where the Saudi government oversees the religious pilgrimages to
Mecca and supervises a sacred area,101 not where secular matters are
concerned, such as supervision of a public hospital.1 °2 This interpre-
tation would avoid widening the bona fide occupational qualification
exception of Title VII any further, and answer concerns expressed by
other writers on possible interpretations of the ruling in Kern.
10 3
These concerns include the question of whether Kern would allow a
company to require that all helicopter pilots be Muslim, or whether
Saudi Arabian law can supersede United States law so easily. 104
One other aspect of the Kern case, not even questioned by the
court, concerns Dynalectron's practice of sending "pilots to indoctri-
nation courses where they were taught the basic formulation of the
Islamic faith, converted thereto, and received a certificate manifesting
said conversion."105 Admittedly, it may not be the place of a United
97. Id. at 1200.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). See also supra note 39.
99. Asherman, supra note 61, at 322.
100. T. PEASLEE, supra note 66, at 1095.
101. R. NYRoP, supra note 71, at 125-26.
102. See, eg., Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1570.
103. Note, The Biases of Customers in a Host Country as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualifi-
cation: Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 335 (1984). The commentator ex-
pressed concern that one possible interpretation would be that "being Moslem is reasonably
necessary to flying a helicopter." Id. at 336, n.4. This would also avoid the question of whether
the court was misinterpreting Fernandez itself (to be discussed later) in ruling effectively that
Moslem law superseded U.S. law in the facts presented in Kern. Id.
104. Ia
105. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1198.
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States judge to question a religious conversion, especially under the
First Amendment, 1° 6 but to allow such a casual attitude to exist to-
wards conversion to Islam may bode ill for United States corporate
relations with Islamic governments. The court's own language indi-
cates that the court itself is aware that such a conversion may not be a
bona fide total committment to a new faith. In effect, the court's im-
plication-that it will not question the sincerity of a religious conver-
sion in allowing Dynalectron to first hire helicopter pilots and then
give them at least the appearance of the required religious alle-
giance-may stretch the meaning of "bona fide" in the bona fide occu-
pational qualification exception. The necessity may be bona fide, but it
is questionable whether the new found religious faith of Dynalectron's
employees is bona fide. Allowing a casual attitude to exist towards
adherence to the Islamic faith may cause further cultural clash and
hurt a company's relationships with the Saudi people. The court is
allowing Dynalectron's plight to blind its eyes to the possible decep-
tion practiced as a bona fide religious conversion, where there may
truly be only an economic conversion.
Further questioned is the court's analogy to "discrimination
against women of child-bearing age in order to protect the safety of
their unborn children." 1°7 Here, safety of a third party is not in-
volved, only that of helicopter pilots hired by Dynalectron who refuse
to convert to Islam and who will not be injured unless actually forced
to land in Mecca itself. United States courts have traditionally been
protective of physical danger in hiring employees only where there is
almost inevitable danger to all workers.108 Here, where the danger is
speculative and can be compensated for by insurance, danger pay, or
both, may be an instance where the courts should let the worker
choose whether to accept a given job. The theory of "protective be-
nevolence" has previously led to many discriminatory laws inhibiting
the employment of women. Kern should not serve as a reversal of the
trend away from discrimination disguised as protection.
106. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ...... U.S. CoNsT. amend. .At least one court has interpreted this
to mean that the government cannot consider the merits of a religious belief. Universal Life
Church, Inc., v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 770, at 776 (E.D. Calif. 1974).
107. Kern, 577 F. Supp. at 1200.
108. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see also Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. &Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
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2. Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine
In Abrams,109 Jewish physicians were excluded from participat-
ing in a medical program supplying cardio-vascular teams to Saudi
Arabia. The teams stationed in Saudi Arabia received greater com-
pensation than those remaining in Texas.110 The district court found
that Baylor's decision to exclude Jews from its Saudi Arabian pro-
grams was based on stereotypical assumptions concerning Saudi atti-
tudes toward Jews;III that Saudi Arabia never explicitly required that
Baylor not send Jews for this program; 2 that other programs had
insisted on, and received, non-discrimination clauses in their contracts
with the Saudis;11 3 and that therefore there was no BFOQ defense
available to Baylor. 4 The court thus extended protection from the
state level to the federal level under United States law to Jews who
wish to work in Saudi Arabia.
Abrams can be seen as comparable to an earlier New York case,
American Jewish Congress v. Carter,"1 which involved an oil com-
pany's hiring practices in New York State and a state law similar to
Title VII. 6 In American Jewish Congress, protection was based on
the theory that religious affiliation can never be a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification except in a case concerning a religious organiza-
tion.117 Such would seem to be an implication of the court's ruling in
Abrams, although this can also be seen as a narrow ruling on its facts,
where there was explicit discrimination against a certain religion in a
non-religious setting.
Abrams reiterates a persistent theme in the discussion of United
States/Saudi relationships. Although Saudi Arabia is not receptive to
Israeli interests, it has and will accept American Jewish workers on
contract to United States companies. In part, this is because Saudi
Arabia desperately needs the skills brought by United States contract
workers, 18 and will therefore accept American Jews simply as United
States citizens, while Israelis are still barred.
109. Abrams, 581 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
110. Id. at 1573.
111. Id. at 1579.
112. Id. at 1575.
113. Id. at 1576.
114. Id. at 1579.
115. Am. Jewish Congress, supra note 8.
116. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(lXa) & (c) (McKinney 1982).
117. Am Jewish Congress, supra note 8, at 221.
118. R. NYRop, supra note 71, at 144; A. SHAw & D. LONG, supra note 83, at 44-45.
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One other aspect of Abrams deserves mention: the court's discus-
sion of the Export Administration Act (EAA). The court ruled that
plaintiffs were entitled to sue under the EAA 9 because American
Jews were members of the class covered by the EAA; 2 ° Baylor acted
with the intent to honor the Saudi boycott; 2' and Baylor's actions
were specifically prohibited by the EAA.122 This ruling gives United
States employees one more tool with which to fight discrimination in
hiring for overseas positions.
This ruling may have a far-reaching impact on American Jews
wishing to work in Arabic countries, because it requires that compa-
nies make affirmative efforts to have Jews accepted as employees by
the Saudis and because the ruling allows individuals to sue under both
the EAA and Title VII. The Abrams case has not been appealed or
overruled, and thus has considerable precedential value, when cou-
pled with American Jewish Congress v. Carter, in furthering the inter-
ests of Jewish citizens seeking to work abroad for United States
companies (since this type of discrimination is not confined to Arabic
countries).
B. Sexual Discrimination
Employment of women in Saudi Arabia is more problematical
than employment of specific religious groups. Custom, as embodied
in the Shari'a, supplemented by Royal decree, and enforced by the
Committee for the Encouragement of Virtue and Discouragement of
Vice, 1 23 requires that women dress modestly in public, not appear
alone in public, and work only in segregated environments-if
there. 24 These requirements are incorporated into the Saudi Arabian
legal system, and thus are not comparable to the customer preference
119. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 et seq., 15 C.F.R. § 369.1 et seq.
120. Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1581.
121. Id. at 1581-82.
122. Id. The court quotes an example gleaned from 15 C.F.R. § 369.2(b) as being exactly
parallel to the actions taken by Baylor:
(i) U.S. construction company A is awarded a contract to build an office complex in
boycotting country Y. A, believing that employees of a particular religion will not be
permitted to work in Y because of Y's boycott against country X, excludes U.S.
persons of that religion from consideration for employment on the project.
A's refusal to consider qualified U.S. persons of a particular religion for work on
the project in Y constitutes a prohibited boycott-based discriminatory action against
U.S. persons on the basis of religion. [emphasis added by the court].
Id. at 1582.
123. R. Nynop, supra note 71, at 125 and 341.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
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standard based on stereotypical attitudes towards women which has
been specifically rejected as a BFOQ by United States courts.1 25
These requirements more closely resemble the laws which each coun-
try is required to honor by the Treaty1 26 promulgated between Saudi
Arabia and the United States in 1933, which provides that citizens of
Saudi Arabia and the United States shall be subject to the laws of the
country where they are presently situated. 127
With this background in mind, it is interesting to examine an
analogous case involving sex discrimination based upon the perceived
needs of foreign customers. In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 12s plaintiff
Fernandez claimed she was refused a promotion based upon her gen-
der. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that Ms.
Fernandez was denied a promotion based on her performance record
and not on her gender, but did not follow the lower court's BFOQ
analysis. 129 The Ninth Circuit refused to find masculine gender a
bona fide occupational qualification where there was "testimony that
[defendant] Wynn's South American clients would refuse to deal with
a female DIO [Director of International Operations]." 1 30 The court
noted, based upon previous United States cases, that "stereotypic im-
pressions of male and female roles do not qualify gender as a
BFOQ."1
31
Furthermore, the court stated that the EEOC (Equal Employ-
125. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
126. Provisional Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Sa'udi Arabia in Regard to Diplomatic and Consular Representation, Juridical Protection, Com-
merce, and Navigation. Nov. 7, 1933. 48 Stat. 1826, 142 L.N.T.S. 330 (1934).
127. Id Relevant provisions include:
ARTICLE II. Subjects of His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia in the the United
States of America, its territories and possessions, and nationals of the United States
of America, its territories and possessions, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,.. . [i]n
respect of their persons, possessions, and rights. . . shall enjoy the fullest protection
of the laws and authorities of the country,
ARTICLE IV ....
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as a limitation of the right of either
Government to impose, on such terms as it may see fit, .. regulations for the en-
forcement of police or revenue laws.
There are, at present, no cases specifically interpreting the treaty. However, in line with the
Supreme Court ruling that Japenese nationals are subject to U.S. employment laws (including
Title VII) when hiring in the United States, it would seem analogous that U.S. nationals,
including women, would be subject to Saudi employment laws while in Saudi Arabia. See
Sumito Shoji Am., Inc., 457 U.S. 176.
128. 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 1276.
130. Id.
131. Id. [citations omitted].
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ment Opportunity Commission) "has held that the need to accomo-
date racially discriminatory policies of other countries cannot be the
basis of a valid BFOQ exception."1 32 In addition, the court ruled that
Title VII applies in all cases where hiring occurs within the United
States:
Though the United States cannot impose standards of non-discrim-
inatory conduct on other nations through its legal system, the
district court's rule would allow other nations to dictate discrimi-
nation in this country. No foreign nation can compel the non-en-
forcement of Title VII here.
1 33
It is unlikely that the Fernandez dicta, concerning "stereotypic
impressions of male and female roles," would apply in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabian dictates against women in business are the result of
law, not simply stereotype.1 34 Also, Saudi Arabian law is based on
segregation of men and women, not on a perceived inability of women
to excel in business. Many Saudi women have managed their own
business affairs for some time,13' and now are allowed to work in
banks staffed by and serving only women.
136
The United States government has agreed that all United States
citizens will honor Saudi law when operating in Saudi Arabia,1 37 and
United States corporations must follow United States law while
recruiting employees within the United States.1 38 It therefore appears
that United States corporations must recruit women for Saudi posts
as they normally would for domestic posts-but will be allowed to tell
the women that acceptance of any job in Saudi Arabia includes segre-
gation of single women from male co-workers in social situations and
all other strictures applicable to women in Saudi society. Although
such an honest appraisal of the job requirements will probably lead to
few women being recruited, it is unlikely to lead to successful court
action on the basis of discriminiation, for the United States employer
will only be applying Saudi law as required.1 39 Additionally, a United
States corporation may be forced to set up segregated work situations
132. Id. at 1277 [citations omitted].
133. Id. [citation to Am. Jewish Congress omitted].
134. See supra notes 65-71.
135. A. SHAw & D. LONG, supra note 83, at 96.
136. Islamic Law, supra note 65, at 479.
137. Supra note 125.
138. Supra note 131.
139. But see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
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to accomodate women employees.' 4 However, the great expense,
combined with the foreign location, might preclude imposition of
such a requirement on a company operating in Saudi Arabia. Only if
service in Saudi Arabia were a prerequisite for promotion within a
company would a court be likely to order such a drastic solution.
IV. SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAW
Under current United States statutory and case law, United
States corporations that recruit within the United States for place-
ment in overseas positions must follow a policy of strict non-discrimi-
nation in hiring or promoting on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or sex. This may at times conflict with treaty requirements
that United States citizens and corporations are subject to Saudi law
when operating in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, United States corpora-
tions must use care in formulating policies regarding employment of
women and Jews for positions in Saudi Arabia.
Corporations should ensure that their contracts with Saudi Ara-
bia or with Saudi companies contain clauses mandating non-discrimi-
nation against Jews in hiring. Such non-discrimination clauses have
been successfully implemented in previous contracts with the
Saudis.141 Other non-discriminatory measures would include ensur-
ing that no employee, whether Jewish or not, carries a visa indicating
visits to Israel; this can be done, if necessary, by obtaining a substitute
visa. 42 By taking these elementary precautions, a United States cor-
poration should be able to comply with Saudi strictures against Israel
without violating the EAA or Title VII requirements of non-discrimi-
nation in religion or national origin.
Complying with hiring requirements regarding women may be
more problematical. As outlined above, in order to avoid violation of
Title VII, United States corporations must have a reasonable factual
basis to believe that being male is "of the essence" of the job. 43 An
employer cannot depend on an assertion of "customer preference."
Instead, proof of a woman's total inability to conduct her job because
140. In one case, the court has required a domestic employer to provide private restrooms
and facilities for female employees comparable to those provided for male employees. Har-
rington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Ed., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 932
(1979).
141. Abrams, 581 F. Supp. at 1576.
142. Id. at 1574-75.
143. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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of her sex must be produced. ' " In Saudi Arabia this may not be diffi-
cult, since Saudi law, both Shair'a and ministerial regulations, se-
verely limit the role of women. 14 5
United States corporations may still wish to hire women for posi-
tions in Saudi Arabia, despite these restrictions. Whether this would
be practical in a given situation would depend on a number of factors:
(1) the willingness of American women to comply with Saudi dress
and behavior strictures;1" (2) the continued changes in Saudi Arabia
leading to greater acceptance of western social behavior; 4 7 and (3) a
balance between the necessity of the presence of a given woman in a
position and the economic considerations involved in setting up a seg-
regated work environment. 4 s This last balancing test would be ap-
plied where a corporation might otherwise be able to prove that being
male was essential to its business operations, but was still willing to
make adjustments in an effort to bypass Saudi law.
In the rare event that a corporation needed to hire a Muslim
worker for a given job, as in Kern, the corporation must look at both
its responsibility as a representative of a foreign culture operating in
Saudi Arabia and the necessity of operating in a religious environ-
ment. Perhaps Dynalectron or similarly situated companies could
consider recruiting Islamic residents in the United States and training
them for the required job, instead of recruiting those with skills
needed for the job and then arranging for conversion to Islam. In
view of the extreme deference given religion in Saudi Arabia, this
might be a better course of action to maintain good business relation-
ships between United States corporations and Saudi society. In either
event, supplying Muslims for such a job should not lead to a penalty
under Title VII after Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., since the court specif-
ically allowed a non-religious entity to hire only Muslims under nar-
rowly defined conditions.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
This comment has essentially focused on the conflict of laws
problems inherent in enforcing anti-discrimination laws against
144. Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276-77.
145. See text accompanying notes 81-88.
146. Id.
147. R. NyRop, supra note 71, at 96-97.
148. Cf. notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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United States corporations operating in Saudi Arabia: when are these
laws preeminent? Other, less tangible considerations are at play in
employment decisions, whether acknowledged or not. These may in-
clude considerations of overall foreign policy and the effect of impos-
ing American values on a foreign culture.
A. Saudi/United States Relations
Can United States corporations consider United States foreign
policy, and the dependence on Arabian oil, 4 9 in making hiring deci-
sions for employees going to Saudi Arabia? As stated most clearly in
American Jewish Congress, foreign policy is conducted by the federal
government, not private corporations; foreign policy is specifically en-
trusted to the executive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment by the Consitution.150 The language of Justice Epstein is clear
on this point:
There is no treaty; there is no compact, there is no agreement be-
tween the United States and Saudi Arabia relating to the entry of
Jews into Saudi Arabia. Aramco's contract with the government
of Saudi Arabia cannot be given the status of a treaty of the United
States, and not even Aramco dares make any such assertion.
When Commissioner Carter declares that American interests in the
Near East "outweigh the abstract vindication of state sovereignty" he
makes the Commission for which he speaks the vassal of a foreign
potentate. When Commissioner Carter seeks to justify his dismissal
ofpetitioner's case on a claim that "the secuirity of the United States
is involved" (second determination, p. 9), he arrogates to himself the
functions of the State Department of the United States which has
made no such declaration. 151
According to this ruling, then, United States corporations cannot
themselves set foreign policy, but can only follow any policy set by the
State Department; this dictum is not always followed, as noted by
several commentators.
1 52
149. Am. Jewish Congress, 9 N.Y. 2d at 229.
150. Congress is empowered "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations. U.S.
CONST. art. I § 8(3). The President "ha[s] power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties. . . ." Id., art. II, § 2(2).
The States (and, by implication, any non-Federal body) cannot enter into treaties or alli-
ances, or impose duties on imports or exports, implying that all foreign relationship powers are
reserved to the federal government.
151. Am. Jewish Congress, 190 N.Y.S. 2d at 223, 224 (emphasis in original).
152. Note, Civil Rights in Employment and the Multinational Corporations, 10 CORNELL
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B. American versus Saudi Cultural Values
Will imposition of American cultural values on Saudi Arabian
society--even indirectly--cause great harm either to that culture or
to the United States corporation? Authorities differ on this question.
Many authorities see a mere United States presence as a beneficent
example to a host country, especially where American cultural stan-
dards are "objectively higher" than those of the host country.
153
Others see the imposition of American standards as arrogance.
154
Still a third group sees a middle ground between "cultural relativism
on the one hand, where we feel we have no right whatsoever to value
our own traditions above others, and absolute cultural imperialism or
arrogance on the other, [where we are convinced that our way at
home is right for everyone]." ' Those in favor of a middle ground
argue that the desire to defer to local customs entirely may be a prod-
uct of the western-educated classes in host countries, while other
groups may not expect or desire such tolerance from those in posi-
tions of power and privilege. 56 "Thus those who talked about the
MNCs [multi-national corporations] from this level tended to argue
for something between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism
(difficult as that point may be to define) and for increased sensitivity
to the consequences, foreseen or unforeseen, of massive economic
presence." 
157
It must be noted that continued Saudi modernization is being
brought about by Saudis who themselves have been educated in the
West and have helped to import foreign culture."s In the face of such
change, the enforced segregation of non-Muslim foreigners from the
mass of Saudi peoples, and the economic/social differences already
established between Saudis and United States citizens, it appears un-
INT'L L.J. 87 (1976), at 111, and A. 107, citing L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973).
153. Sucre, quoted in Discussion on Moral Arrogance, Legal Constraints, and the Search for
Higher Standards, in THE NATION-STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CON-
FLICT 53 (Gunneman ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as THE NATION-STATE]. Sucre does not
define how a social standard can be "objectively" higher, thus avoiding the issue of value
judgments.
154. Marshall, in THE NATION-STATE, supra note 151, at 45-46. "The attempt by any
American group to determine what is socially desireable in another country beyond obedience
to that country's law is arrogant." Id,
155. Weiner, Multiple Interests in International Bargaining, in THE NATION-STATE, supra
note 151, at 147.
156. Gunnemann, Summary and Analysis, in THE NATION-STATE, supra note 151, at 165.
157. Id. (emphasis in original).
158. R. NYmoP, supra note 73, at 96-97.
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likely that a United States corporation's application of non-discrimi-
natory hiring standards for United States personnel will be a major
source of friction. Saudi Arabia may always refuse to issue visas to
those it views as threatening-women hired to work in an integrated
environment, for instance. Also, it would not be likely that any dis-
criminatory charges could be filed in such an instance. Thus, steps to
actively encourage defiance of Saudi laws should not be taken.
Rather, a gradual change will probably be assimilated, as it has been
in most other Arab countries.
15 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the flexibility possible in the courts' attitudes towards
enforcement of Title VII and related laws in Saudi Arabia may appear
to indicate a softening of the attitute towards discrimination in em-
ployment, this is probably only a superficial view. Courts continue to
vigorously enforce employment discrimination laws within the United
States, extending such coverage to foreign corporations operating
within United States borddrs.1 ° There is only an appearance of laxity
in enforcing Title VII where there is direct conflict between Title VII
and the laws of another nation. Such flexibility allows United States
corporations to operate in Saudi Arabia without violating Saudi laws
or American precepts of non-discriminatory treatment in hiring, pro-
motion, and conditions of employment.
For many reasons, it is best for United States corporations to
continue to fully comply with Title VII, the EAA, and the Executive
Order in hiring for overseas positions. Such compliance has in the
past been well tolerated in other countries. For example, certain
United States corporations have insisted on hiring blacks in South Af-
rica as they would in the United States, and have persisted despite
government opposition. 6 This is analogous to the position of many
United States corporations in hiring Jews for work in Saudi Arabia, as
outlined in the Abrams case. 62 United States corporations seem to
vigorously support American views of racial or religious equality in
159. See Note, Human Rights Practices in the Arab Statesr The Modern Impact of Shari'a
Values, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 55, at 63 nn. 48-49 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 11.
161. See e.g., Comment, United States Labor Practices in South Africa: Will a Mandatory
Fair Employment Code Succeed Where the Sullivan Principles Have Failed?, 7 FORDAM
INT'L L.J. 358, 362-67 (1984).
162. See text accompanying note 112.
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employment opportunity, even when employees will be working
where such equality is not the rule and may even cause friction.
It would be consistent for United States corporations to insist
upon the same treatment for sex as for race or religion. To date, this
has not happened; even internal application of Title VII to sex has
never been as stringent in legal terms as it has been for other suspect
classifications. 163 Some commentators have argued that sex will, and
should, always have its own special status within the suspect classifi-
cations of race, religion, sex, and national origin, based upon privacy
needs and biological differences.16' The domestic cases to date require
that a bona fide occupational qualification exemption based upon sex
must be substaniated by an immutable sexual characteristic. 165 Com-
panies cannot simply argue that customers prefer to deal with men'
66
or that women provide for perceived psychological needs on a job. 167
United States companies may find it difficult to accomodate women
who desire to work in Saudi Arabia and other strictly sex-segregated
societies, but this should not be the deciding factor. The objective
capabilities of the worker should be the deciding factor in hiring deci-
sions. United States citizens must be able to make their own decisions
about the desirability and advisability of working in a closed, sex-seg-
regated environment in a foreign culture. Protectionism towards one
sex is not a policy favored in United States courts, except in the ex-
treme case of violence or (possibly) harm to a fetus. 161
The attitude of Saudi women must also be taken into account.
Just as United States corporations honor the desire of South African
blacks to work in integrated jobs for pay equal to that of whites, so
should they honor the statements of Saudi women who believe that
women can, consistent with Islam, work, and do so in an integrated
environment.1 69 By continuing to operate within the guidelines of
United States law, United States corporations will be promoting the
equality of all-an announced goal of United States policy-while
163. See Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
583, passim.
164. Ia
165. See Sex as a BFOQ, supra note 36, at 161.
166. See Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276.
167. See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387.
168. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36 (1976); Kern, 581 F. Supp. at 1200.
169. Wallace, Saudis Debate the Role of Women, L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, § 5, at 24,
col. 1. In this article Princess Heseh, wife of Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz, and
Aisha A-Mana, a feminist Saudi educator, both advocate work for women.
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still honoring the culture of Saudi Arabia. This would especially hold
true for those companies with federal government contracts, since
they must employ persons without regard to "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin regardless of the policies of the country where
the work is to be performed or for whom the work will be per-
formed."17 Although this ideal may sound like cultural imperialism,
it is more likely another example of the preeminence of the goal of
true equality within American life.
Hedwig C. Swanson
170. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.10 (1984).

